On June 16, 2016, Rule 4.33 of the Alberta Rules of Court, commonly known as the Drop Dead Rule, was revised. Revised Rule 4.33 now provides for a “suspension period” and the parties may enter into an agreement or apply to the court for a decision stating that a given period is not taken into account in calculating the three-year period under the rule. Amended Rule 4.33 now stipulates that the three-year delay period does not work when an agreement has been reached with a specific date or event. This seems to indicate that the parties have no objection to delaying the action as a whole. In addition, we interpret the amended rule in such a way that the suspension period can be removed from the three years, so that at the end of a certain date, if nothing has been done to advance the action, the clock starts where it left off before the suspension period. If this informal status quo agreement had been formalized, this request would not have been necessary. The Alberta Rules of Court, Alta. Reg. Regulation (EC) No 390/1968 contains Part 24 which regulates `delay in the continuation of acts`. However, Rule 243.1 allows the parties to adopt their own rules regarding additional delays and delays in pursuing their claim and to circumvent the court rule: Weir-Jones provided services to Purolator under an agreement that was reached in January 2008. Shortly thereafter, Weir-Jones believed that Purolator had breached its contractual obligations and raised its complaints with Purolator in a letter dated November 3, 2008.

Weir-Jones sent a letter in August 2009 in which he announced the deal. The application was filed on 22 July 2011. The Court of Appeal confirmed that, since the current statute of limitations provides for the test of the beginning of the limitation period, alternative starting points (such as the date of the infringement, the date on which the last services are provided under a service contract, the date of economic damage, the date of acceptance of the termination or termination of the contract) do not apply. unless another proposed date coincides by chance with the test of the law (para. 53). The Tribunal explained the error in the application of the provisions of the former Act (para. 52) ruled on the jurisprudence of the Chamber Judge and found that “the erroneous assumption of the beginning of the limitation period for applications for infringement does not affect the outcome of the proceedings” (para. 63). The Court of Appeal found that the limitation period began when Weir-Jones discovered or “knew” that he had a right against Purolator (at paragraph 55).

Since the Chamber Judge found that the limitation period had not been extended by settlement negotiations between the parties by a standstill agreement (para. 41), the applicant was in any case not in time. . . .